Last updated at Fri, 26 Jan 2024 21:10:29 GMT
Summary
The Workspaces component of Biscom Secure File Transfer (SFT) version 5.1.1015 is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting in two fields. An attacker would need to have the ability to create a Workspace and entice a victim to visit the malicious page in order to run malicious Javascript in the context of the victim's browser. Since the victim is necessarily authenticated, this can allow the attacker to perform actions on the Biscom Secure File Transfer instance on the victim's behalf.
Product Description
Biscom Secure File Transfer (SFT) is a web-based solution that replaces insecure FTP and email, allowing end users to easily send and share files without IT involvement. More about the product is available on the vendor's web site.
Credit
These issues were discovered by Orlando Barrera II of Rapid7, Inc, and disclosed in accordance with Rapid7's vulnerability disclosure policy.
Exploitation
After authenticating to the Biscom Secure File Transfer web application, an attacker can alter the "Name" and "Description" fields of a Workspace, as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3.
In addition, the File Details component within a Workspace is also vulnerable to stored XSS injection. An attacker can save arbitrary Javascript in the "Description" field of the File Details pane of a file stored in a Workspace.
Remediation
As of version 5.1.1025, the issue has been resolved. Absent an update, a web application firewall (WAF) may prevent attackers from entering the malicious XSS, and/or protect users by stripping offending XSS.
Vendor Response
Security is the top priority for Biscom and we appreciate Rapid7 identifying this issue and bringing it to our attention. Once we were informed, our team moved quickly to release a patch within a week to address the issue. Biscom is not aware of any customers being impacted by this issue and Biscom sees the likelihood as low since an authenticated user is required. Biscom values the sharing of security information and we thank Rapid7 in evaluating our application's security.
Disclosure Timeline
Biscom's response to this issue was exemplary, taking less than 30 days from private notification to a public fix, as seen in the timeline below.
- Thu, Mar 30, 2017: Discovered and reported by Orlando Barrera II
- Tue, Apr 04, 2017: Initial contact to the vendor
- Fri, Apr 07, 2017: Details disclosed to the vendor
- Thu, Apr 20, 2017: Disclosed to CERT/CC (VRF#17-04-VTJCJ)
- Wed, May 03, 2017: Fixed version 5.1.1025 provided by the vendor
- Wed, May 03, 2017: CVE-2017-5241 reserved by Rapid7
- Tue, Jun 27, 2017: Public disclosure