Last updated at Fri, 25 Aug 2023 19:17:55 GMT
DLL search order hijacking is a technique used by attackers to elevate privileges on the compromised system, evade restrictions, and/or establish persistence on the system. The Windows operating system uses a common method to look for required dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to load into a program. Attackers can hijack this search order to get their malicious payload executed.
DLL sideloading is similar to the above mentioned technique; however, instead of manipulating the search order, attackers place their payload alongside the victim’s application or a trusted third-party application. Abusing trusted applications to load their payload may bypass restrictions and evade endpoint security detections since they are loaded into a trusted process.
Attribution remains a topic of significant subjectivity, especially when attempting to connect an attack to a nation state. A common approach in determining the source has been to evaluate the techniques used by the perpetrator(s). DLL search order hijacking (T1574.001) or DLL sideloading (T1574.002) are common approaches used by nation state sponsored attackers.
PlugX
The PlugX malware family, which has been around for more than a decade, is famous for using both techniques to bypass endpoint security and inject itself into trusted third party applications. PlugX is a remote access trojan with modular plugins. It is frequently updated with new functionalities and plugins.
In recent years, MITRE ATT&CK, CISA, and others have associated the PlugX family with various Chinese actors. Builders of the PlugX malware have been leaked to the public and can be used by other actors having access to the builders.
In January 2023, we observed activity from a China-based group called Mustang Panda using PlugX in one of their campaigns. In this particular case, they used a virtual hard disk (VHD) file, to hide the malicious files from antivirus detection. The VHD, which automatically mounted when opened contained a single archive file (RAR) that extracted the typical three files associated with PlugX:
- Trusted binary (executable .exe)
- Hijacked driver (DLL file)
- Encrypted payload file (often a DAT file)
The trusted binary ranged from compromised AV vendor files, operating system files, and third-party vendor files. These files are signed and therefore most of the time trusted by endpoint technology.
This approach is known as a Mark-of-the-Web bypass or MOTW (T1553.005). In short, container files that are downloaded from the Internet are marked with MOTW, but the files within do not inherit the MOTW after the container files are extracted and/or mounted. When files are marked with the MOTW, if they are not trusted or downloaded from the Internet, they will not be executed.
While we observed Mustang Panda using aVHD file to hide malicious files, it is worth noting that ISO files may also be used, as they are also automatically mounted.
Hunting with Velociraptor
Since PlugX is injecting itself into a trusted process, abusing a trusted executable, this threat is often detected when the outgoing Command & Control Server (C2) traffic is being discovered (usually by accident or that someone flagged the IP address as being malicious). One classic mistake I’ve observed over the years is that when companies see in their AV logs that malware has been removed, they often don’t look further into what type of malware it is, its capabilities, and whether it is nation-state related or cybercrime related. However, the appropriate incident response handling differs in approach for each.
Many nation-state actors want to be long term persistent into a network and have established ways of staying inside, even if a few of their open doors are being closed (think about valid accounts added, webshells, other backdoors, etc.). A dead C2 server can indicate this, as the actor may have used it as a first entry to the network.
For example, we recently observed what appeared to be an incident where some suspicious password dumping tools were discovered. Although the security team removed the tools, they seemed to come back into the network.
After meeting with the team and reviewing some of the logs of the incidents, it was time to grab one of my favorite (and free) tools: Velociraptor. Velociraptor is Rapid7’s advanced open-source endpoint monitoring, digital forensic and cyber response platform. It enables users to effectively respond to a wide range of digital forensic and cyber incident response investigations and data breaches.
With a ton of forensic options and hunting possibilities, the first thing was to acquire live collections of data to investigate.
After investigating the initial memory dumps, remnants were discovered where a process was talking to an outside IP address. The process itself was using a DLL that was not located in a standard location on disk. After retrieving the folder from the victim’s machine and reversing the process, it became clear: PlugX was discovered.
There are several ways Velociraptor can be used to hunt for DLL search order hijacking or sideloading. In this particular case, we’ll discuss the approach for PlugX malware.
We could hunt for:
- Process / Mutex
- Lnk Files
- Disk
- Memory
- Network traffic / C2 URL/IP-address
Using the YARA toolset, we created rules for malicious or suspicious binaries and/or memory patterns. Velociraptor can use these rules to scan a bulk of data or process memory or raw memory using the ‘yara()’ or ‘proc_yara’ options.
Based on recent PlugX samples (end of 2022, beginning 2023), the we created the following rule (which can be downloaded from my Github page):
Using this rule, which is based on code patterns from the DLL component used in PlugX, Velociraptor will hunt for these DLL files and detect them. Once detected, you can look at the systems impacted, make a memory-dump, process dumps, etc., and investigate the system for suspicious activity. The directory where the DLL is stored will most likely also have the payload and trusted binary included, all written to disk at the same time.
Recently my colleague Matt Green released a repository on Github called DetectRaptor to share publicly available Velociraptor detection content. It provides you with easy-to-consume detection content to hunt for suspicious activity. One of the libraries Matt is importing is from https://hijacklibs.net/, a list of files and locations that are indicators of DLL hijacking (including PlugX). If you look at the non-Microsoft entries in the ‘hijacklibs.csv’, several instances are related to PlugX incidents reported by multiple vendors.
After importing the content, Velociraptor can start hunting and detecting possible signs of DLL hijacking and, for example, PlugX.
Happy Hunting!
Matt Green, Principal Software Engineer - D&R, contributed to this article.
