Details for this vulnerability have not been published by NIST at this point. Descriptions from software vendor advisories for this issue are provided below.
From VID-6F5192F5-75A7-11ED-83C0-411D43CE7FE4:
The Go project reports:
os, net/http: avoid escapes from os.DirFS and http.Dir on Windows
The os.DirFS function and http.Dir type provide access to a
tree of files rooted at a given directory. These functions
permitted access to Windows device files under that root. For
example, os.DirFS("C:/tmp").Open("COM1") would open the COM1 device.
Both os.DirFS and http.Dir only provide read-only filesystem access.
In addition, on Windows, an os.DirFS for the directory \(the root
of the current drive) can permit a maliciously crafted path to escape
from the drive and access any path on the system.
The behavior of os.DirFS("") has changed. Previously, an empty root
was treated equivalently to "/", so os.DirFS("").Open("tmp") would
open the path "/tmp". This now returns an error.
net/http: limit canonical header cache by bytes, not entries
An attacker can cause excessive memory growth in a Go server
accepting HTTP/2 requests. HTTP/2 server connections contain a
cache of HTTP header keys sent by the client. While the total number
of entries in this cache is capped, an attacker sending very large
keys can cause the server to allocate approximately 64 MiB per open
connection.
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